Dagstuhl-Seminar 26171
Privacy-Preserving Authentication
( 19. Apr – 24. Apr, 2026 )
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Organisatoren
- Foteini Baldimtsi (George Mason University - Fairfax, US)
- Lucjan Hanzlik (CISPA - St. Ingbert, DE)
- Anna Lysyanskaya (Brown University - Providence, US)
- Stefano Tessaro (University of Washington - Seattle, US)
Kontakt
- Michael Gerke (für wissenschaftliche Fragen)
- Christina Schwarz (für administrative Fragen)
Privacy-preserving authentication is an emerging field focused on enhancing user privacy in digital identity management systems. The current authentication systems often expose user identities, which raises concerns about privacy. This Dagstuhl Seminar addresses key challenges in the development and deployment of privacy-preserving authentication techniques, particularly anonymous credentials and blind signatures, which allow users to prove possession of credentials without revealing their identities.
The seminar explores several critical issues, including the integration of post-quantum security, efficient revocation mechanisms, and the standardization of privacy-enhancing technologies like anonymous credentials, anonymous tokens, blind signatures, etc. We will examine the theoretical foundations and practical deployment of these technologies, focusing on issues such as the scalability of revocation protocols, the efficiency of cryptographic schemes, and their compatibility with real-world systems like decentralized identity infrastructures. Special attention will be given to ongoing standardization efforts, such as the W3C Verifiable Credentials and IETF Privacy Pass. Additionally, we aim to identify future research directions and open problems that need to be addressed for the widespread adoption of privacy-preserving authentication solutions. We invite researchers from both academia and industry to participate in this seminar to foster collaboration and innovation in this rapidly evolving field.

Klassifikation
- Cryptography and Security
Schlagworte
- blind signatures
- anonymous credentials
- zero-knowledge proofs