- Die Grenzen von elektronischen Wahlen.
- Die Grenzen von elektronischen Wahlen
- US-Wahlcomputer können keine vertrauenswürdigen Wahlen garantieren
- Wähler-Selbstkontrolle - Experten ringen um Vertrauen in elektronische Wahlmaschinen
- Veranstaltungsbesprechung «Frontiers of Electronic Voting»
- Wie man Bewegungen analysiert (Kopie 1)
- Observing the English and Scottish 2007 e-elections : article : S. 380-395 - Jason Kitcat ; Ian Brown - Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008 - (Parliamentary affairs ; 61. 2008, 2 : S. 380-395).
- Tagung Frontiers of Electronic Voting, 29. Juli bis 3. August 2007 auf Schloss Dagstuhl : Veranstaltungsbesprechung : S. 718 - Reimer, Helmut - Wiesbaden : Vieweg, 2007 - (DuD : Datenschutz und Datensicherheit : 2007, H. 9 : S. 718).
- Towards Trustworthy Elections : New Directions in Electronic Voting - Chaum, David; Jakobsson, Markus; Rivest, Ronald L.; Ryan, Peter Y. A.; Benaloh, Josh; Kutylowski, Miroslaw; Adiba, Ben - Berlin : Springer, 2010. - VIII, 401 S. - (Lecture notes in computer science : State-of-the-Art Survey ; 6000). ISBN: 978-3-642-12979-7 / 3-642-12979-X.
- Under Scrutiny - Experts struggle for trust in electronic voting machines. Richard Sietmann. English translation from the German report published 03.09.2007 by c't magazine 19/2007.
- Wähler-Selbstkontrolle - Experten ringen um Vertrauen in elektronische Wahlmaschinen. Bericht von Richard Sietmann, 03.09.2007. c't 19/2007, S. 84: E-Voting. (German only)
- US-Wahlcomputer können keine vertrauenswürdigen Wahlen garantieren. Bericht von Richard Sietmann, 06.08.2007. Heise Online (German only)
- Veranstaltungsbesprechung «Frontiers of Electronic Voting»
im DuD Report des Journals Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 09/2007
Bericht der Seminarorganisatoren
- Wahlmaschinen zur Stimmauszählung.
Interview von Jürgen Rinner mit Rob Gongrijp und Ronald L. Rivest
Ausstrahlung am 02.08.2007 im "Aktuellen Bericht" des Saarländischen Rundfunks
Die Grenzen von elektronischen Wahlen
Democracy and voting systems have received considerable attention of late, with the validity of many elections around the world being called into question. The US experience demonstrates that simply deploying technological “solutions” does not solve the problem and can easily exacerbate it. Nevertheless, many other countries are either deploying e-voting and e-counting systems or planning to do it.
The aim of the seminar was to present and discuss promising technologies, schemes, and cryptographic protocols to achieve high assurance of accuracy and privacy in the casting and counting of votes. Special attention was given to attacks and dangers that emerge for electronic voting systems.
The challenge is highly socio-technical in nature: requires an excellent understanding of the potentialities and dangers of technological approaches as well as an appreciation of the social, legal and political impact. The seminar thus aimed to bring together researchers and practitioners from academia and industry, whose work relates to electronic voting systems, to evaluate the state of the art, to share practical experiences, and to look for possible enhancements. The overall aim then was to stimulate discourse between the various stakeholders and enhance the understanding of voting technologies and practices.
Dagstuhl Accord on Electronic Voting
Participants of the 2007 Dagstuhl Conference on Frontiers of E-Voting agree that:
Taking advantage of technology to improve large-scale elections has recently captured the interest of researchers coming from a number of disciplines. The basic requirements pose an apparently irreconcilable challenge: while voter confidence hinges on transparently ensuring integrity of the outcome, ballot secrecy must also be ensured. Current systems can only address these essential requirements by relying on trust in those conducting the election or by trust in the machines and software they use. Some promising new systems dramatically reduce the need for such trust. What are called ”end-to-end” voting systems, for example, allow each voter to ensure that his or her vote cast in the booth is recorded correctly. They then allow anyone to verify that all such recorded votes are included in the final tally correctly. Surprisingly, through use of encryption typically, these systems can also provide privacy of votes. They do this without introducing any danger of ”improper influence” of voters, as in vote buying and coercion. Moreover, such systems offer all these properties without relying on trust in particular persons, manual processes, devices, or software.
Care must still be taken to ensure proper implementation and education of voters in order to avoid misuse or incorrect perceptions. Some are also concerned that the level of understandability and observability of hand-counting of paper ballots in polling places will not be matched by electronic systems. The challenge for governments and civil society should be to find ways to foster development and testing of new election paradigms in general and to allow them to be assessed and expeditiously rise to meet their potential to improve elections.
The challenges for the technical research community now forming around election technology includes further exploration and refinement of these new types of systems. Particularly promising and important areas include analysis, formal modeling, and rigorous proofs regarding systems and potential threats. Initial deployments of these systems are starting to provide valuable real-world experience, but effective ways to communicate and expose their workings may also be important. The goal is systems that increase transparency regarding the correctness of the election results and yet maintain secrecy of individual votes. Improved voter confidence may follow.
Voting over electronic networks has various attractions, is starting to be deployed, and is regarded by some as inevitable. No solution, however, has been proposed that provides safeguards adequate against various known threats. Problems include attacks against the security of the computers used as well as attacks that impede communication over the network. Improper influence of remote voters is also a significant problem, although it is tolerated with vote by mail in numerous jurisdictions. Securing network voting is clearly an important research challenge. We cannot, however, prudently recommend any but unavoidable use of online voting systems in elections of significant consequence until effective means are developed to address these vulnerabilities.
- Michael Alvarez (CalTech - Pasadena, US)
- Josh Benaloh (Microsoft Research - Redmond, US)
- Ian Brown (CMU - Pittsburgh, US) [dblp]
- David Chaum (KU Leuven, BE) [dblp]
- Michael Clarkson (Cornell University, US)
- Olivier de Marneffe (University of Louvain, BE)
- Stéphanie Delaune (ENS - Cachan, FR) [dblp]
- Rop Gonggrijp (Amsterdam, NL)
- J. Alex Halderman (Princeton University, US)
- Benjamin Hosp (George Washington University - Washington, US)
- Catsumi Imamura (IEAv - São José dos Campos, BR)
- Rui Joaquim (Technical University of Lisboa, PT)
- John Kelsey (NIST - Gaithersburg, US) [dblp]
- Aggelos Kiayias (University of Connecticut - Storrs, US) [dblp]
- Joseph Roland Kiniry (University College Dublin, IE) [dblp]
- Robert Krimmer (E-Voting.CC - Viennna, AT)
- Przemyslaw Kubiak (Wroclaw University of Technology, PL)
- Miroslaw Kutylowski (Wroclaw University of Technology, PL)
- David Lundin (University of Surrey, GB)
- Tal Moran (Weizmann Inst. - Rehovot, IL)
- Olivier Pereira (University of Louvain, BE)
- Stefan Popoveniuc (George Washington University - Washington, US)
- Bart Preneel (KU Leuven, BE) [dblp]
- Jean-Jacques Quisquater (University of Louvain, BE) [dblp]
- Ronald L. Rivest (MIT - Cambridge, US) [dblp]
- Michael Roe (Microsoft Research UK - Cambridge, GB)
- Mark D. Ryan (University of Birmingham, GB) [dblp]
- Peter Y. A. Ryan (Newcastle University, GB) [dblp]
- Kazue Sako (NEC - Kawasaki, JP) [dblp]
- Roberto Samarone Araujo (TU Darmstadt, DE)
- Steve Schneider (University of Surrey, GB) [dblp]
- Berry Schoenmakers (TU Eindhoven, NL)
- Bruno Simeone (Sapienza University of Rome, IT)
- Ben Smyth (University of Birmingham, GB)
- Vanessa Teague (The University of Melbourne, AU) [dblp]
- Jacques Traoré (Orange Labs - Caen, FR) [dblp]
- Melanie Volkamer (Universität Rostock, DE) [dblp]
- Poorvi Vora (George Washington University - Washington, US)
- Dan Wallach (Rice University - Houston, US) [dblp]
- Filip Zagórski (Wroclaw University of Technology, PL)
- Dagstuhl-Seminar 11281: Verifiable Elections and the Public (2011-07-10 - 2011-07-15) (Details)
- security / cryptography
- interdisciplinary with non-informatics-topic standardization
- legal and social problems
- political sciences
- electronic voting
- voting machines
- anonymous channel
- privacy protection
- digital receipts
- coercion resistance
- thread models
- formal security analysis
- voting protocols
- commercial voting systems
- legal models
- usability and social effects