

DAGSTUHL SEMINAR 10101

Computational Foundations of Social Choice

Monday morning 9.00 (*chair: Brandt*)

Welcome/introduction session

Faliszewski: Campaign Management via Bribery

E. Hemaspaandra: The Shield that Never Was: Societies with Single-Peaked Preferences are More Open to Manipulation and Control

Walsh: Where are the hard manipulation problems for STV elections?

Monday afternoon 14.00 (*chair: Hemaspaandra*)

Aleskerov: Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices

Slinko: Weighted and Roughly Weighted Simple Games

Merlin: On the stability of a scoring rules set under the IAC

Puppe: Axiomatic Districting

Peters: Non-cooperative approaches to claims or bankruptcy problems

Tuesday morning 9.00 (*chair: Zwicker*)

Sanver: Approval as an intrinsic part of preference

Fischer: Strategyproof Selection from the Selectors

Kilgour: Approval Balloting for Multi-Winner Elections

Brams: Satisfaction Approval Voting

Tuesday afternoon 14.00 (*chair: Conitzer*)

Brill: Minimal Retentive Sets in Tournaments

Betzler: Data reduction and problem kernels for voting problems

Endriss: Voting with Restricted Ballot Languages

Zwicker: Voting machines

Laslier: Voting humans

Wednesday morning 9.00 (*chair: Laslier*)

Klamler: Divide-and-conquer: a proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm

Rothe: Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols

Klaus: Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

Meila: (Bayesian) Statistics with Rankings

Wednesday afternoon 14.00

EXCURSION (hike if weather permits)

Wednesday after dinner 19.30

Conitzer: False-name-proof voting in social networks

RUMP SESSION

Thursday morning 9.00 (*chair: Zwicker*)

Elkind: Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstentions

Xia: Unique game-theoretic outcomes for strategic voting with complete information

Kóczy: The men who were not even there: Legislative voting with absentees

Freixas Bosch: Power indices for games with abstention with probabilistic interpretation

Thursday afternoon 14.00 (*chair: Conitzer*)

Altman: Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament

Goldsmith: The Complexity of Manipulating Probabilistic Tournaments

Lang: How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?

Maudet: The possible winner problem with a growing set of candidates

Eckert: Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules

Friday morning 9.00 (*chair: Brandt*)

Markakis: On Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms

Yokoo: False-Name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Hudry: Complexity of the aggregation of orders into median orders

Closing