September 28 – October 2 , 2014, Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 14401
Privacy and Security in an Age of Surveillance
Matt Blaze (University of Pennsylvania, US)
Bart Preneel (KU Leuven, BE)
Phillip Rogaway (University of California – Davis, US)
Mark D. Ryan (University of Birmingham, GB)
Peter Y. A. Ryan (University of Luxembourg, LU)
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Revelations over the last few years have made clear that the world's intelligence agencies surveil essentially everyone, recording and analyzing who you call, what you do on the web, what you store in the cloud, where you travel, and more. Furthermore, we have learnt that intelligence agencies intentionally subvert security protocols. They tap undersea cables. They install malware on an enormous number targets worldwide. They use active attacks to undermine our network infrastructure. And they use sophisticated analysis tools to profile individuals and groups.
While we still understand relatively little about who is doing what, the documents leaked by Snowden have led to the conclusion that the Five Eyes organizations are going far beyond anything necessary or proportionate for carrying legitimate intelligence activities. ot an equivalent access to documents Governmental assurances of oversight have come to ring hollow, as any oversight to date seems to have been ineffectual, and is perhaps a complete sham.
Can democracy or nonconformity survive if the words and deeds of citizens are to be obsessively observed by governments and their machines? The rise of electronic surveillance thus raises questions of immense significance to modern society. There is an inherent tension. Machine-monitored surveillance of essentially everything people do is now possible. And there are potential economic, political, and safety benefits that power may reap if it can implement effective population-wide surveillance. But there is also a human, social, economic, and political harm that can spring from the very same activity.
The goal of our workshop was to gather together a mix of people with knowledge and expertise in both the legal and technological aspects of privacy and surveillance, to try to understand the landscape that we now live in, and to debate approaches to moving forward. We invited people from a wide range of domains, including members of the intelligence community. All invitees in the intelligence community declined the invitations - in most cases choosing not even to reply. Also, we found that we had more success in getting positive replies from members of the technical community than members of the legal or regulatory communities. Consequently, the makeup of the workshop was not as diverse and balanced as we had hoped. Nonetheless, we felt that we achieved a healthy mix, and there was plenty of lively debate. The issues addressed by this workshop were unusually contentious, and discussions at times were highly animated, even heated.
It is often argued that privacy is not an absolute right. This is true, but this is also true of other rights. The right to freedom must be tempered by the fact that people who are convicted of crimes may forfeit this right for a period. Equally, someone for whom there are sound grounds for suspicion might forfeit some privacy rights. But in any event, any such breaches must be targeted and proportionate and justified by well-founded grounds for suspicion.
An important observation that came up repeatedly in discussions is that privacy is not just an individual right but essential to the health of a democratic society as a whole.
How can society as whole be provided strong assurance that intelligence services are "playing by the rules" while at the same time allowing them sufficient secrecy to fulfill their role? It seems feasible that technical mechanisms can contribute to solving this problem, and indeed a number of presentations addressed aspects of it. One might imagine that something analogous to the notion of zero-knowledge proofs might help demonstrate that intelligence agencies are following appropriate rules while not revealing details of those activities. Another possibility that was proposed is to make the amount of surveillance public in a verifiable fashion but without revealing the targets. Thus one might imagine that a specified limit be placed on the proportion of traffic available to intelligence services. The effect would be to force the agencies to be correspondingly selective in their choice of targets.
The crypto and security community should invest a substantial effort to make all layers of the internet and our devices more secure and to strengthen the level of privacy offered. This may create a natural barrier to mass surveillance and will also bring a more robust network infrastructure to a society that is increasingly reliant on it for critical services. Such a development may eventually increase the cost for targeted surveillance, but there is no indication that this would become prohibitive.
As is traditional for Dagstuhl, we started with a round table of quick introductions from the participants, including brief statements of what they hoped to get out of the workshop. We then had an open discussion on the goals of the workshop and of how best to organise the workshop to achieve these goals. It was decided to structure discussions into three strands:
- Research directions
The outcomes of these discussions are detailed in a separate "Manifesto" document. The workshop was then structured into a number of plenary sessions alternating with breakouts into the three strands. The plenary sessions were made up of presentations from participants and feedback from the breakouts followed by discussion.
The problems addressed in this workshop are immensely challenging, and carry vast implications for society as a whole. It would not be reasonable to expect a small group of people - and a group not particularly representative of society as a whole - to produce solutions in the course of four days. Our goal was to gain some understanding of guiding principles and ways forward.
Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
Bart Preneel and Phillip Rogaway and Mark D. Ryan and Peter Y. A. Ryan
- Data Bases / Information Retrieval
- Security / Cryptology
- Society / Human-computer Interaction
- Big data
- Mass surveillance